Joby–Toyota and Archer–Stellantis Are Not the Same Factory Strategy

Both eVTOL developers recruited an automaker, yet the boundary between aircraft designer, component supplier and production partner sits in a different place.

Joby starts from vertical integration

Joby says it designs, tests and manufactures critical components in-house, including propulsion, flight-control computers, electronics and software. That strategy grew from a claimed lack of suitable off-the-shelf technology when the program began. It gives the aircraft team tight control over interfaces and rapid feedback between design, production and flight test.

Toyota is not merely offering generic factory advice. It has supplied engineers, helped shape Joby’s Marina pilot line, manufactured Joby-designed powertrain and actuation components, invested capital and become Joby’s preferred manufacturing partner. In 2026 the companies established a joint venture intended to prepare for S4 manufacturing. Joby retains ultimate authority over aircraft design while Toyota’s role spans design-for-manufacture, supply and prospective production.

Archer deliberately uses more established suppliers

Archer has described a certification strategy that sources a large share of Midnight subsystems from aerospace suppliers with existing certification experience. The argument is that proven vendors, processes and documentation can reduce development and approval risk. Archer still owns aircraft integration and develops core technology, but the boundary is less vertically integrated than Joby’s public model.

Stellantis brings a different layer: capital, manufacturing labor, process expertise and support for Archer’s Covington, Georgia facility. Announced plans have targeted production scaling toward 650 aircraft annually, subject to the agreements, certification, demand and a successful ramp. The factory exists; the target is not the same thing as demonstrated sustained output.

Integration speed and supplier maturity pull opposite ways

In-house components can be optimized around one aircraft. Engineers can change a motor, inverter, software controller and structure together without negotiating four vendor roadmaps. The risk is that the company must mature many specialized production processes itself and carry the capital, staffing and quality-system burden.

Supplier-led architecture can use parts with traceable aerospace pedigrees and organizations accustomed to certification records. The trade is interface management. A requirement change can cross contracts, lead times and configuration systems. The integrator must prove that separately mature parts behave safely as one novel powered-lift aircraft.

Automotive volume does not erase aerospace discipline

Toyota and Stellantis know high-rate production, statistical quality control, automation and supplier management. Aircraft manufacturing adds serialized traceability, approved design data, conformity inspections, strict change control and continued-airworthiness obligations. A car factory’s takt time cannot simply be copied into an eVTOL line.

The automaker contribution is most valuable where repeatability and waste reduction meet aviation records. Fixtures, work instructions, torque capture, nonconformance handling and supplier quality can scale without weakening traceability. The production certificate and approved quality system—not the partner’s brand—authorize the output.

Capacity claims need a denominator

Joby has expanded Marina and is building Ohio capability while reporting multiple aircraft in flight and more in production. Archer has completed its high-volume facility and is building Midnight aircraft while expanding flight operations. Those are concrete steps. Annual-capacity numbers remain designed ceilings until staffing, suppliers, yields and demand sustain them.

Compare conforming aircraft completed per quarter, first-pass yield, rework hours, supplier shortages and delivered-aircraft reliability. Also ask which entity holds production responsibility, who owns tooling, and how a design change propagates. Those measures expose the operating model more clearly than square footage.

The partnership labels hide evolving relationships

Joby is not simply “making everything itself,” because Toyota supplies components and the alliance is deepening. Archer is not merely handing a drawing to Stellantis, because Archer remains the aircraft designer and integrator while developing internal propulsion and software capabilities. Both are hybrids, and both relationships have changed as certification and capital needs evolved.

Continued airworthiness is the long test

Production strategy continues after delivery. Each design change, service bulletin and replacement part must remain traceable to an approved configuration. A vertically integrated company may diagnose fleet issues quickly because design and operations share data, but it also owns the corrective workload. A supplier-heavy program can draw on specialist support, yet must coordinate remedies across corporate boundaries.

The useful comparison is how fast each network closes that loop. When a component fails, who identifies the affected serial numbers, approves the fix, supplies the part and returns aircraft to service? Toyota and Stellantis can strengthen process discipline, but the aircraft certificate holder remains accountable for showing that the fleet conforms and stays airworthy.

Early delivery cadence should therefore be read beside service readiness: spare holdings, repair approvals, technician training and field reliability. A high-rate line creates little passenger capacity if completed aircraft wait for rework or if grounded units cannot obtain approved replacements quickly.

Bottom line

Joby’s advantage thesis is integrated design with Toyota helping industrialize it. Archer’s is certification-aware sourcing plus Stellantis-backed assembly scale. The decisive evidence will be conforming output, yield, reliability and cost—not which automaker’s name appears beside the aircraft.